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Articles
An Appropriate Economic Model of Judicial
Review of Suburban Growth Control*
NEAL A. ROBERTS**
Many American suburban governments, concerned about the
shape and rate of growth in their communities, have been making
inventive use of their police and tax powers to direct, slow or
change development. These efforts have often been challenged in
court, where judges have generally failed to develop a body of con-
sistent doctrine.' What they have done instead is to attach a gen-
eral presumption of validity to the municipal land use policies2 and
then intervene sporadically on constitutional grounds to protect
developers, certain housing consumers or landowners.
In response to this general policy of deference combined with
occasional intervention, academicians like Professor Robert Ellick-
son have called for a substantial change in judicial approach. They
* The author would like to thank Professor David Dowall of the University of California,
Berkeley, and Bill Dato, a University of California, Los Angeles, law student, for their
valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. I would also like to thank the Institute
for Urban and Regional Development at the University of California, Berkeley, and the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, whose assistance made this
paper possible. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at the School of Law, University
of California, Los Angeles, for their valuable insight and help with the article.
** A.B. 1966, M.A. 1967, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. 1970, University of
California, Berkeley. Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of California, Los Ange-
les; Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
' See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 388 (1977); Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence
of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1978).
2 E.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See generally, Note, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs:
Policy Formulation and the Constitutionality of Municipal Growth Restricting Plans, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 803, 808 n.22 (1976); Note, Municipal Self-Determination: Must Lo-
cal Control of Growth Yield to Travel Rights?, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 174-75 (1975); Note,
The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV.
760 (1976).
SE.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Board
of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). See generally Com-
ment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
537, 562-74 (1971).
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would like to "make it relatively easy for a genuinely aggrieved
party to shift to the suburb the burden of proving the efficiency
and equity of suburban policies."4 We are told this change from
the present "Pollyannish view that giving suburbs a free hand at
planning will lead to a better urban future," is needed in order to
protect the citizenry against "housing monopolies and inequities
among landowners and consumers." 5 The underpinnings of this
call for such unprecedented judicial intervention is the fear of seri-
ous misallocations of resources through the cartelization of housing
supply. This new doctrine of trust-busting of the suburbs is based
upon an economic model of the suburbs which accents their poten-
tial for monopoly profits.
This article, which provides a more accurate model of the sub-
urbs, seeks to show that such a fear of cartelization is not a valid
reason for increased judicial intervention and that the present pos-
ture of judicial deference allows for the efficient production of a
wide range of housing products while encouraging efficient local
government. Similarly, the present sporadic constitutional inter-
vention allows judges to force suburban governments to redistrib-
ute wealth at the local level, as needed. It also allows the courts to
supervise the access to local procedures. The model points out why
injunctive, rather than compensatory, remedies are most often cho-
sen by intervening judges.
The analysis in this article is based on the assumption that the
behavior of suburban governments in a given region is not unlike
the behavior of small firms in a competitive industry. The first sec-
tion of this article, Economic Reasons for Growth Control, exam-
ines this assumption in the context of growth control, describing
the economic motivations which lead suburbs to behave competi-
tively. This first section also develops three basic economic motiva-
tions which might encourage a suburb to impose growth controls:
avoidance of congestion externalities, better product development
or an attempt to extract monopoly profits due to artificial scarcity.
The analysis shows that it is impossible to tell in any given circum-
stance which justification is controlling in the minds of government
" Ellickson, supra note 1, at 469.
5 Id. at 511. For a discussion of the possibility of actually bringing an antitrust case, as
opposed to the use of takings and substantive due process doctrine to that end, see City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), and Gainesville Utils. Dept.
v. Florida Light & Power Co., 573 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1978). See Bosselman, Does the Lafay-
ette Case Bring Zoning Under the Antitrust Laws?, 31 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4
(1979).
[Vol. 55:441
SUBURBAN GROWTH CONTROL
officials. Moreover, even in those situations where it is obvious that
a suburb is attempting to extract monopoly profits, that effort may
merely represent one cost of achieving an efficient system of local
government.
The second section of this article, A Model for Analyzing Growth
Control, develops a model to explain the mechanics of suburban
growth control. The section begins with a focus on the individual
suburb, noting the various methods by which a suburb can seek to
control growth (i.e., regulation, subsidies and charges) and illus-
trating the superiority of a system of charges over other alterna-
tives. This analysis also addresses the tricky problem of distin-
guishing subsidies from "compensation," suggesting that prior
discussions of the problem have failed to take account of the man-
ner in which the risks or possibilities of governmental growth con-
trol actions are capitalized in the price which the landowner pays
for his property..
The second section then changes its focus from the individual
suburb to the region in which the suburb operates, describing the
mechanics of regional suburb competition and introducing into the
model the impact of such factors as the provision of public goods
and services, and the control of negative externalities by the subur-
ban government. The conclusion drawn is that a regional urban
system where individual suburbs compete with each other by
means of growth controls is in fact an economically efficient sys-
tem. Thus, judicial intervention in such a system to invalidate
growth controls cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
The second section finally surveys the effect of the ad valorem
property tax on the model. This survey leads to a conclusion that
distributional considerations constitute the only valid justification
for judicial invalidation of suburban growth control measures.
That argument is based on an assumption that wealth redistribu-
tion is desirable and that local governments under instructions
from a court can be a good vehicle for accomplishing such a redis-
tribution. If such an assumption is accepted, it follows that achiev-
ing an efficient system of suburban competition by means of
growth controls may require periodic intervention by the courts to
insure that wealthy economic interests do not isolate themselves in
homogeneous suburbs. The discussion emphasizes, however, that
even intervention on distributional grounds must be used sparingly
in view of the risk that such intervention may engender serious
inefficiencies in the system.
The third section of this article, Judicial Review of Growth Con-
1980]
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trols, utilizes the conclusions drawn from the model to construct a
description of judicial attitudes toward growth controls. This dis-
cussion points out that the nature of the legal rules adopted by the
courts is strongly influenced by policy considerations which are in
turn molded by an admittedly idiosyncratic pattern of value judg-
ments. The discussion shows, however, that if these value judg-
ments and policy considerations are made explicit, the current pat-
tern of judicial decisionmaking with respect to growth controls is
not merely an ad hoc exercise in arbitrary behavior but rather can
be justified both on efficiency and distributional grounds.
ECONOMIC REASONS FOR GROWTH CONTROL
Economic Motivations: Why Does a Suburb Compete?
This article takes as its basis an economic or public choice model
of local government which presupposes that the local legislature is
a vehicle for the private self-maximization of its constituents' in-
terests. While there are other ways to analyze local government
decisionmaking, usually based on a public value or public interest
model, the economic model seems the most relevant for a discus-
sion of the possible dangers of local monopoly.8 Suburban govern-
ments in a metropolitan region are thus assumed to make decisions
in a manner similar to that utilized by small firms operating in a
competitive industry. Because this proposition is not self-evident,
it is best to begin with an examination of this assumption, focusing
on the extent of this similarity and describing its impact on the
analysis of suburban government behavior in imposing growth con-
trols within individual suburbs.
An economist would tell us that the hypothetical small firm in a
competitive industry operates with a profit-maximizing motiva-
tion.7 This simple axiom forms the basis of most of microeconomic
theory and analysis concerning the behavior of the firm in the mar-
ketplace. If we are to analogize the suburb to a small firm and as-
sume that suburbs in a metropolitan region "compete" with each
6 For an elaboration of this public choice model, see generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975); W.
RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). For a contrast between the public
choice model and the public value or interest model, see Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legiti-
macy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1978).
See K. LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICRO-ECONOMICS 166 (2d ed. 1974).
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other," we must attempt to explain what it is that suburbs are try-
ing to maximize and why it is that they want to maximize itY
We begin by observing that an individual chooses to live in one
suburb, as opposed to another, in order to maximize the satisfac-
tion of his own internal preferences. Thus, the desirability to him
of living in a particular location is represented by the'excess of the
benefits derived from the location over the costs associated with
living in the location. The benefits derived from the location in-
clude such things as convenience, scenic values and the general
quality of municipal services in the suburb. The costs include not
only land and housing costs but also the costs associated with a
particular location such as the transportation costs incurred in get-
ting to work, schools or shopping centers, and the taxes and
charges which the resident will have to pay for the support of the
municipal government.
For any individual, the desirability of a particular location will
be determined by his own unique tastes and preferences. But for
the society as a whole, the market price of land at a particular lo-
cation is a function of its social desirability.10 The incoming resi-
dent will choose to live in that location which maximizes the posi-
tive difference between his own subjective valuation of the location
and its market price. To this incoming resident, the market price is
only one of the "costs" associated with the location. The situation,
however, is somewhat different for the established resident. It is in
his interest to maximize the market price of his land so long as this
maximization does not decrease his own subjective valuation of the
location's desirability." Each member of the suburb's population,
through the collective decisionmaking process of municipal govern-
s The notion that suburban governments "compete" with each other is not unheard of.
See generally Anderson, Introduction to Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 465, 467 (1971). While a certain amount of "competition" has been recognized by law-
yers in the past, it has not been analyzed in an economic sense and therefore has been
generally characterized as selfish and socially undesirable.
9 Some observers might argue that local governments are so inept that they do not in fact
maximize the interests of the local majority and thus the analogy to the firm is inapt. If this
were true one would of course not have to worry about local monopolies seeking to maximize
local interests at all.
. " See generally Lafferty & Frech, Community Environment and the Market Value of
Single-Family Homes: The Effect of the Dispersion of Land Uses, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 381
(1978); Stull, Community Environment, Zoning, and the Market Value of Single-Family
Homes, 18 J.L. & ECON. 535 (1975).
" This assumes that the resident's motivation for buying the property was investment
and the enjoyment of the habitation. The investor seeks to maximize the market price of his
parcel and his own subjective valuation of his enjoyment of the property, that is, his con-
sumer surplus.
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ment, thus attempts to maximize first, his own subjective valuation
of desirability and second, the market price of his land.12 In many
cases, the collective decisions of the suburb's population will ap-
proximate society's preferences and the suburban government will
be motivated in general to maximize the average market price of
land in the suburb. The extent to which the preferences of a sub-
urb's population differ from general social preferences will deter-
mine the degree of differentiation between and among suburbs.
If suburbs and suburban governments are motivated by a force
analogous to the profit maximization motive of the firm, it should
be expected that in a metropolitan region composed of many dif-
ferent suburbs, each attempting to maximize its own desirability in
the eyes of its residents, a system. will evolve which is not unlike
competition. We now turn to an exploration of why a "competing"
suburb, motivated to maximize its own desirability, would attempt
to impose growth controls.
Economic Justifications: Why Does a Competing Suburb Impose
Growth Controls?
If we accept the notion that a suburb behaves much like a firm,
the next question would appear to be, "What 'product' is the sub-
urb producing?" One answer would be that suburban municipal
governments are primarily concerned with providing municipal
services for consumption by the suburb's population. But this view
is too confining because it excludes the incoming resident and also
because it makes the "shareholders" (i.e., the established re-
sidents) in our "suburban firm" its only consumers. What, in fact,
is being produced is the suburb itself, or perhaps more accurately,
residential units in the suburb. The potential consumer "buys" the
product by becoming a resident of the suburb.
A firm decides how many units of its product to produce in re-
sponse to market price and its own marginal costs.13 Our
"suburban firm," however, cannot directly control the number of
residential units produced. It can only indirectly influence the pro-
12 Some writers have made the mistake of ignoring the subjective valuation and concen-
trating on the market price. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 449 n.175. While market price is
important, it is probably considerably less so than the subjective valuation. This is because
any increase in subjective valuation occurs almost immediately while any increase in market
price is realized only on sale. See Willemsen & Phillips, Downzoning and Exclusionary Zon-
ing in California Law, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 103 (1979).
13 See generally M. MCCARTY, DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 24-33
(1976).
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duction" by the imposition of various types of growth controls.
These controls are imposed because of three basic economic
considerations.
Declining Marginal Benefits from Growth for the Congested
Suburb
Some empty suburbs may be able to absorb new entrants
costlessly while some choked and teeming suburbs may suffer a
tremendous burden from even one more entrant. A marginal analy-
sis of the productivity of the suburbs in accommodating new en-
trants in a metropolitan region shows that some municipalities
have a much lower cost per new entrant than others. If this is so,
then controls in the high-cost suburbs have the effect of pushing
production towards the least cost producers.
To understand this, the concept of -marginal analysis must be
explained. In the context of a firm, the focus would be the margi-
nal productivity of the plant: as the quantity of one input, such as
labor, increases in combination with a fixed quantity of other in-
puts, such as the machinery in the plant, the marginal physical
productivity of the variable input must eventually decline. That is,
while the first additional unit of labor will result in an increase in
production of X units, each additional unit of labor will result in
something less than an X-unit increase. 14
The same general notion can be applied to a suburb that pro-
vides benefits which are consumed by all of its residents and paid
for out of tax monies. As residents are added to a new community,
the cost per unit of consumption of municipal services will go
down. That is, the larger the number of residents in the commu-
nity, the lower will be the tax price per capita for a specific quanti-
ty of municipal services. The individual resident will find that he is
benefiting from having the service at progressively lower unit
prices. However, at some point the resident will also discover that
he is beginning not to enjoy the consumption of the services as
much because the number of other residents with whom he must
share the services is ever increasing. That is, the marginal benefits
flowing to the residents of the particular suburb will, at some
point, start to decline.
From the standpoint, then, of each suburb with a given physical
size, there will be an early time in its development when it needs
14 See K. LANCASTER, supra note 7, at 102.
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residents in order to decrease the per capita costs of new facilities
such as schools and parks. There will also come a time when the
marginal benefits that the existing residents derive from having a
new neighbor are equal to the costs of the neighbor moving into
the community. However, at some point, because residents will
have decreasing enjoyment in the shared community facilities, the
marginal benefits flowing to the members of the community will
start to be less than the marginal costs that the new residents oc-
casion by their arrival. This means that there will exist an optimal
size and density for each suburb. 15
Assume, for example, a suburb which has only one municipal fa-
cility, a beach with a lifeguard. The first resident will have a very
high tax bill, namely the entire salary of the lifeguard, but also a
considerable amount of enjoyment since he will have to share the
lifeguard's services with no one. As new residents arrive, however,
the tax price for the first resident will go down as he shares the
lifeguard's salary with his new neighbors. His enjoyment of the
beach will presumably decrease slightly as he is forced to share it
with a few other individuals. At some point, as more and more new
residents move in, the decrease in his enjoyment which one more
new resident causes will exceed the benefit to his tax bill resulting
from the addition to the community of one new taxpayer. The sub-
urb thus goes from a position of less than optimum size to a posi-
tion of optimum size where the benefit the resident receives from
the new entrant is exactly matched by the new entrant's cost. If it
then continues to grow past optimum size, the suburb could at-
tempt to deal with this problem by opening up more beach or
training more lifeguards. Still, at some point the physical limits of
the facility will bring about an optimum size. 16
In analyzing a suburban world containing a series of suburbs, it.
would be desirable to be able to determine when each suburb
reaches its optimum size, for the efficiency of the entire system
would be furthered not by endlessly increasing the inputs, but by
capping some suburbs and opening up new ones with lower present
marginal costs which have not yet reached their optimum size.
Since costs are not absorbed by suburbs at a uniform marginal
rate, suburbs will benefit from their ability to vary this regulatory
1 Analogizing to the firm again, for any given schedule of costs and for any given market
price, there is a corresponding optimal output for the firm. This optimal output will maxi-
mize the firm's profits. See M. MCCARTY, supra note 13.
"6 This example can be shown in a graph from Professor Buchanan's economic theory of
clubs. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
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package or to impose development charges. For a suburb which
had already reached its optimum size (i.e., marginal costs now
equal marginal benefits), the efficient strategy would be to attempt
to continue making the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits.
This could be done by either decreasing the costs that the new
residents impose upon the community or by increasing the benefits
that their arrival would occasion. This type of system will neces-
sarily impose higher entry costs on later entrants than on earlier
COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED
WITH VARIOUS SUBURB SIZES
X
Y 2
Total E
Costs,
Benefits Y1
Per
Capita El
for the E
Beach CN
Si SN BN
Number of Persons in Suburb
The X axis represents the costs and benefits from the beach and the Y axis represents the
number of residents in the community. Line YC, represents the decreasing costs per capita
of paying the lifeguard and line EB, represents the per capita enjoyment of the beach. (It is
concave because beach enjoyment eventually declines when so many people are on the
beach.) From the time the first resident arrives until the time resident S, arrives the margi-
nal cost of the new residents is less than the marginal benefits which each resident enjoys.
With the arrival of resident S, the marginal cost is exactly equal to the marginal benefit all
residents derive (i.e., the slopes of the cost curve and the benefit curve are equal). After this
point, for each new resident, the marginal benefits begin to be less than the marginal cost.
The S, point thus represents the optimal size of the suburb with one beach and one
lifeguard.
If the suburb does not wish to cap its size at S, it could expand it physical facilities by
putting in more beach and hiring more lifeguards. Such an expanded facility could be repre-
sented by the lines YCN and EBN. Again, however, there would be an optimum size for
the suburb to make use of these facilities, namely SN. Since there are physical limits to the
amount of beach that could be developed (or similarly the amount of parkland or school
land or whatever) this suburb would reach a point where the optimum point could be
passed.
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ones. New and old entrants will be treated dissimilarly, a result
that some commentators have criticized as being unfair.17
The difficulty with these commentators' interpretation of equal
treatment is that it attempts to force uniform costing on a suburb
which cannot possibly know its average cost over the time of pro-
duction. For the efficient operation of the system of suburbs, mar-
ginal costing of the impact of the new entrant is preferable, even
though this will lead to different treatment of oldtimers and new-
comers. This differential treatment is not unfair, however: the old-
timer got his low price when he entered a then relatively remote
new suburb with few amenities; the newcomer can find similar
housing on the same terms if he is willing today to go out to the
sticks and buy a home in a least-cost suburb.
There may well be occasions when it might be desirable to dis-
tribute wealth from the oldtimers to the newcomers or vice versa,
but this is a question quite divorced from that of equal treatment
and it would, of course, depend upon the relative wealth positions
of the two groups. If the new entrants are, for example, low-income
homebuyers, one might want the oldtimers to subsidize the new
entrants' more expensive entry to a crowded suburb. This could be
done by requiring equal entry prices for the latecomers and then
spreading their higher costs throughout the group of oldtimers in
the form of higher taxes.18
The Need to Produce a Better Product
A second reason why a suburb might want to change its pattern
of controls is that the demand for various types of housing and
communities has changed in the metropolitan area. Consider a
sparsely settled municipality at the edge of a major city where the
suburb's initial development resulted from the establishment of a
fish packing plant or other harbor facility. The controls in such a
municipality would be designed to accommodate the workers in
the local industry and the general housing package of combined
shelter and municipal services would result in a modest product to
meet the modest pocketbook of the workers. It would be a Chevro-
let suburb. Now assume that the major city enjoys economic pros-
perity and the fishing industry suffers a decline. It may be that
17 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 1, at 459-65.
18 The concept of wealth redistribution is discussed in more detail in the second section
of this article, A Model for Analyzing Growth Control, infra.
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there is a demand for a better housing package. This suburb can
then begin to produce that needed product by building better
schools or putting in larger houses. It can become a Cadillac
suburb.
This change from one type of housing product to another will
have an impact upon the number of units produced within that
suburb, but this may or may not be efficient depending upon hous-
ing demand and the existence of other suburban housing-produc-
ing suburbs within the region. If there is now a high demand for
Cadillac suburbs and a lower demand for Chevrolet suburbs, then
this shift from one product line to another is simply a response to
that demand.
If the demand for Cadillac suburbs increased, the private market
in the absence of any governmental intervention would begin to
increase the production of Cadillac-type housing. Governmental
action may be required to insure that the Cadillac section of the
suburb maintains its Cadillac character. For instance, if one devel-
oper built a tract of $250,000 homes, there would be a tremendous
incentive for another developer to build a tract of $50,000 homes
across the road, thereby raising the value of the less expensive
homes and lowering the value of the more expensive ones. In es-
sence, he would be reaping an external benefit by locating his tract
next to the $250,000 tract.19
So long as there are myriad possible housing-producing suburbs
within the region, this shift from one product line to another will
have no impact on the productive efficiency of all the suburban
producers. Again, it should be observed that in any given set of
controls, it would be difficult to tell whether this reason was the
motivating rationale.
Attempts to Extract Monopoly Profits
Returning to our analogy of the firm for a moment, there exist
instances in the private market when a firm develops a new and
unique product. The firm, in its effort to maximize profits, will at-
tempt to exploit this uniqueness by denying its competitors access
to information on how to produce the new product. If the product
is unique, that is, if there are no feasible substitutes, the firm may
become a monopolist with respect to its new product. If it has mo-
' See Justice Sutherland's discussion of this rationale in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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nopoly power, the firm will attempt to restrict the supply of the
new product, thus artificially raising prices and extracting monop-
oly profits.20
A suburb which is in some way unique may also attempt to ex-
ploit that uniqueness and extract monopoly "profits" by artifically
restricting the housing supply in the suburb. If one were only to
look at a single suburb, one might conclude that this would result
in a deadweight social loss since it would produce fewer housing
units than if the suburb were not attempting to restrict supply.
However, this may not be a social loss at all when one looks at the
region as a whole.
There exist many situations where small, or temporary, monopo-
lies are allowed in some parts of an industry in order to make the
industry as a whole more efficient. An example is the granting of a
patent. The patent holder invests time and effort in producing a
better product and for that investment is rewarded with a monop-
oly on that particular product. This local monopoly has two effi-
cient effects. First, it provides him with the incentive to invest in
research and development in his production process. Second, his
competitive advantage forces other producers to invest in their
production processing in order to produce a competing product.21
Returning to the suburbs, we can see that there is a similar rea-
son for permitting local monopolies. If a given suburb is unique it
is because it has chosen to provide "unusual public services"22
which make it more attractive than another. Thus an innovation in
one suburb, such as a better school or library or park system, will
give it an advantage that will cause other suburbs to attempt to
replicate those features. As we shall see in the following section, if
there is a system of competing suburbs then such competition may
in fact lead to efficient local government gains which far outweigh
any local consumer loss.
A MODEL FOR ANALYZING GROWTH CONTROL
We have thus far focused on reasons why a suburb might choose
to impose growth controls. The inquiry now shifts to an examina-
tion of how suburbs which choose to impose growth controls go
about doing so. This examination begins with a look at the individ-
20 See K. LANCASTER, supra note 7, at 197.
21 C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BusiNEss 262 (5th ed. 1975).
22 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 430.
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ual suburb. The individual model is then expanded in an effort to
describe the behavior of many small suburbs operating in a metro-
politan region. Finally, the impact of the ad valorem property tax
is evaluated. The conclusion is that a system of competing suburbs,
each with an unrestricted ability to impose growth controls of va-
rying types and degrees, results in an economically efficient alloca-
tion of resources in the production of residential housing units, al-
though judicial intervention invalidating growth controls may
occasionaly be justified on distributional grounds.
The Individual Suburb
If we are to understand how the individual suburb imposes
growth controls, we must, of necessity, examine the tools and
methods available to it. Three types of growth controls will be con-
sidered: regulation, subsidies and charges. In addition, there is
given a brief description of how each type of growth control oper-
ates and an evaluation of its effectiveness for coping with the
problems it is designed to solve.
We must also consider the parameters within which the individ-
ual suburb can impose its controls. In this connection, the problem
of distinguishing "subsidies" from "compensation" will be ex-
plored. It will be argued that compensation for a "taking" in the
fifth amendment sense is justified only where the governmental ac-
tion is totally unexpected, that is, where the risk of the govern-
mental action was not capitalized into the price which the land-
owner paid for his property. If, however, the risk was capitalized,
any governmental payment is, in effect, a subsidy: a payment so
that the landowner will not use his land in a particular way. This
"subsidy" should be explicitly recognized as such and evaluated in
that light, not hidden under the guise of "compensation."
Methods of Competition: Types of Growth Control
In any given city council vote, it is impossible to tell exactly
what the underlying reason for the growth control measure enacted
actually is.2" This is not merely because of the difficult problem of
23 A similar problem has been noted by the United States Supreme Court in recent cases
dealing with the concepts of "racially disproportionate impact" and "racially discriminatory
purpose." See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Pro-
tection-The "Purposeful Discrimination" Requirement, 52 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1978).
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proof but also because the decision is made in a situation of high
uncertainty. The residents who are complaining about increasing
taxes may in fact not know either whether there is an increasing
marginal cost for the new residents or whether their suburb is
unique or whether there is a much higher demand for Cadillac
rather than Chevrolet suburbs within the region. In this situation
of uncertainty, all that is clear is that there will be many instances
where the new entrant to the community imposes more of a bur-
den on the community than his property taxpaying capacity will
produce in benefits. This external harm will not be reflected in the
price of producing his housing unit and the suburb will inef-
ficiently produce too much of the housing.
The community has basically three choices available to it to deal
with these external effects of the new housing production: regula-
tion, subsidies and charges. Regulation attempts to match the
number of entrants to the capacity of the suburb to absorb them.
An example of this would be a Petaluma-style 24 zoning system
which limits the number of units produced per year. A subsidy
consists of a payment to the local housing producers not to impose
the external harm. For example, the community might purchase
half the land owned by a local builder to be used for open space
instead of housing production. A third approach is to impose a
charge upon the local producers equal to the external cost which
the new entrant imposes. An example of this approach would be an
exaction of the same open space land from the builder.
Regulation: A Series of Problems.2 5 Regulation has serious draw-
backs. First, it may prevent the local housing producers in a com-
munity from taking advantage of their own efficiencies. For in-
stance, if a suburb imposed a sewer hookup limit, it would reduce
the production of the builder who installed a double pipe system,
one for rainwater and one for sewerage, as much as one who used a
single pipe system and dumped the entire amount into the city
treatment plant. Under an incentive system, the builder would be
charged only for the amount of increased sewerage that his devel-
opment produced. Therefore, regulation usually does not produce
the least-cost solution. Likewise, regulation does not encourage the
24 This refers to the zoning-growth control system established by the city of Petaluma,
California, the constitutionality of which was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
11 For a discussion of these approaches as applied to air pollution problems, see R. STEW-
ART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 555-617 (2d ed. 1978).
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developers to develop innovative solutions for particular external
harms. For instance, if the problem is congestion of the downtown
shopping area streets, the best solution might be a system of jitney
buses coming in from the outlying developments. A regulation
which simply limits the number of new units which can be pro-
duced in no way encourages individuals to develop that best
solution.
A second set of criticisms of regulation stems from its potential
for delay and uncertainty. Euclidian zoning,26 for example, appears
to lay out rigid zones in which certain land uses are permitted
within the zone. In practice, however, the system represents an
ongoing administrative process of upzoning, downzoning and vari-
ance. The landowner thus does not know at any given time what
land use will actually be allowed and he is always seeking a more
profitable use. The ongoing transaction between the government
and the landowner uses up a great deal of costly legal and adminis-
trative resources.
Another problem with regulation is its inability to make the
costs of the new entrant explicit. A land use regulation that man-
dates only one-bedroom apartments in multiunit buildings or one
single-family house per five-acre lot may have the effect of decreas-
ing the number of children in the municipality or the number of
entrants, but it does not let the voting public or the housing con-
sumer know the extra cost that each new entrant imposes on the
community. Builders frequently say that land use controls increase
their housing unit costs by ten, twenty or thirty percent but these
claims are most often discounted as self-serving excuses for current
high new house prices. A subsidy or a charge per new entrant or
per new square foot of residence constructed makes the added
costs of the new entrant explicit and subject to public debate.
Finally, regulation is ill-suited for making some of the fine tun-
ing adjustments that are necessary when new entrants impose high
costs on particular members of the community. For instance, if a
builder wants to put up a small multiunit structure at a point well
within the built-up section of town, this will impose a set of addi-
tional costs on the residents already there. A strict regulatory sys-
tem can only grant or deny permission to construct the structure,
thus in no way can it compensate the established residents for the
2' See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally R. AN-
DERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.01 (2d ed. 1976); C. SENEKER, LAND USE REGULATION
FOR URBAN GROWTH CONTROL: SELECTED LEGAL PRINCIPLES 1 (1974); Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427 (1978).
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additional costs. A system of charges, on the other hand, could ex-
act a payment from the developer and use those funds to provide
additional compensating services for that neighborhood.
Subsidies: Paying the Producers to Exclude New Entrants. A
second approach is to pay the landowners/housing producers not to
bring new residents into the community. This can be done, for in-
stance, by buying up vacant land and putting in municipal open
space preserves. Such subsidies are frequently called a "compensa-
tory payment," but as we shall see in the next subsection, The Re-
gional Analysis: An Efficiency Criterion, in a land market which
expects government to deal with external impacts, subsidy is a
more accurate description of such a scheme.
A system of subsidies would have some obvious advantages. It
would be more efficient than regulation in that it would allow the
municipality to purchase the least well located, and thus the
cheapest, land for housing development. It would also allow the
local government to fine tune the harm done to the area. In addi-
tion, it could be accomplished quickly with the only significant
transaction costs being the bargaining between the landowners and
the municipality over price. Finally, its most obvious and highly
touted advantage is that it would make the cost of the new en-
trants explicit and it would discourage the local government from
inflating that cost beyond its actual impact upon the community
because the municipality would have to pay for the subsidy out of
scarce tax monies.
Paying the house builders not to harm the community does,
however, have some serious drawbacks. First, unless all of the land
in the community is purchased, the problems of regulation of the
remaining open land will still exist. The new entrants can just as
easily come into the community and live in high-rise multiunit
buildings on only a few acres of land. It is also possible that the
already built-up land could be redeveloped with a higher density.
Second, the purported strength of the approach in discouraging
overvaluation of the harm of new entrants is also its greatest liabil-
ity, for in an era of tax limitations there is a tendency on the part
of municipalities to make short-term savings even if the approach
will in the long run result in larger costs for the community.27 The
27 While a system of subsidies financed by local taxes is a theoretical possibility, the cur-
rent political atmosphere throughout the country makes it no more than an academician's
pipe dream. For instance, in California after Proposition 13, it is legally impossible for local
governments to increase the local property tax to pay for a subsidy system. An increase in
other types of taxes requires "a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors" of the locality. CAL.
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local politician dealing with a one-tax-year municipal budget and a
city election every two or four years may well ignore future munici-
pal costs. The tendency of a subsidy is to undervalue the true neg-
ative impact of new entrants because the persons who must pay
them (i.e., the present residents) make up only a portion of all
those who will derive utility from the land use (namely the present
and all future residents). Although residents of today may be inter-
ested in maximizing future land value they may not be willing to
make sufficient present payments to that end. Once it is realized
that some land use and environmental costs are irreversible, it can
be seen that the subsidy system might result in permanent harm to
future residents..
Also, the subsidy or incentive system would result in an in-
creased demand for the community's land because the municipal-
ity would now be in the market looking for land. Thus a system of
buying such land would tend to distort the price of the remaining
land. Carried to its logical conclusion, one sees landowners going
into the business of not developing land by drawing up elaborate
subdivision plans with the expection that the community will step
in and purchase the land before construction commences.28
The costs of this program would be borne by the local taxpayers
with the payments being made to the landowners/housing produc-
ers. Rather than allowing the local social costs of the new entrants
to be internalized by the housing producers and their consumers,
the subsidy system would leave the costs of the houses that are
produced unchanged. Further, the housing producers would use
the local taxpayers' money to go elsewhere and produce more hous-
ing at a subsidized cost. The result would be that more housing
would be produced than would be the case if the market were al-
lowed to function. While subsidies could theoretically lower the
number of new entrants (assuming the regulatory system does not
respond to the new pressure) the community would fill to its opti-
mum much more rapidly than would a community that had each
housing unit pay its full share of increased costs. Rather than a
series of subtle adjustments, there would be the rapid filling up of
these crowded suburbs and then the jump to the more empty ones.
Such growth would make the provision of services quite difficult in
the short term and could lead to major short-term costs (i.e., storm
sewer runoff or school crowding) even if the community did in the
CONST. art. 13A, § 4. See Willemsen & Phillips, supra note 12.
" See R. STEWART & J. KRMR, supra note 25, at 562-63.
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long term reach its optimum size.
Charges: Making the New Entrant Pay for the Costs He Im-
poses. There is a vast array of mechanisms available to the munici-
pality to charge the new entrant. These include benefit charges,
special assessments and exactions. Each new entrant imposes costs
on the community. Some of these costs occur close to his residence
and have some relationship to his enjoyment of his home, such as
the added costs of the larger pipe to handle his sewage or the local
playground for the entrant's child. Other costs occur at points fur-
ther removed from his residence but are equally important. These
may be capital outlays, such as the need to buy more parking space
at the local beach, or they may be ongoing labor costs that were
not required previously, such as the salary of a full-time, rather
than a volunteer, fire department. Legal writers29 and some state
judges have attempted to distinguish between those two types of
costs, treating charges related to one or the other differently. How-
ever, it would appear that such a distinction is inconsequential
once the differing abilities of various suburbs to absorb new en-
trants is appreciated.
The use of charges is the best mechanism to deal with the harms
generated by the new entrant's arrival. As with subsidies, the
scheme is administratively efficient when compared to prohibitory
case-by-case regulations. These charges act as prices for growth in
the various suburbs. These prices in turn convey information about
each suburb's relative efficiency in absorbing new entrants. Hous-
ing consumers are then in a position to adjust to the prices as they
see fit. If the older community which has already built the fire hall
and the school can supply housing more cheaply, in the form of an
old house that needs repair, than can the new commuter suburb,
then the house purchaser will locate there. If the developer can
afford to develop apartments in the middle of the city areas al-
ready serviced or in the farther removed vacant suburb, then he
will choose to do so. The range of prices varies among the many
suburbs in a metropolitan area, and individual suburbs will vary
the charges depending upon the particular problems of a given lo-
cale. A rocky hillside area will require a higher storm drain exac-
tion than will the flatland. These charges will thus result in least-
cost approaches to the problem of housing production.
As the municipality changes over time, it would be in a position
to change its fees accordingly. If a municipality reaches a point
29 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 475, makes this distinction.
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where a large capital outlay is called for, it can change its entry
price. Similarly, as it reaches its optimum, it can raise its price
accordingly.
Problems of Transitional Equity: Takings
We now have an understanding of both why a suburb would
want to control growth and the mechanisms that are available to
accomplish those aims. We have labeled those cases where the gov-
ernment will choose to pay a landowner in order to change the al-
location of his resources as situations of subsidy. The final point
we must consider is whether there are other grounds for interfering
with the distribution of wealth which results from the govern-
ment's action.
Irrespective of whether government uses prohibitory regulation,
subsidies or charges, if it begins to influence private bahavior, this
will change the profitability of the private activity. To the extent
that these changes in government intervention are unexpected,
they will visit upon the private parties a wealth redistribution, ei-
ther positive or negative. A subsidy not to produce a certain harm
in a community or the upzoning of a corner lot to commercial uses
will give the producer an unexpected windfall, just as an unex-
pected charge on downzoning will create an unexpected loss. It is
the distribution of these losses which forms the problem upon
which judges and legal commentators have expended vast energies,
for this is, of course, the fifth amendment's requirement that pri-
vate property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation."30
The doctrine requires either invalidation of government action
or compensation for landowners in some but not all cases of loss.3 1
30 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a general overview, see Greenawalt, United States of
America, in EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS (A. Lowenfeld ed. 1971).
3' The award of damages rather than an injunction to strike out the offending ordinance
is usually brought by way of an action for inverse condemnation. There has been recent
controversy concerning whether this remedy is available in some states. See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W.
3426 (Jan. 8, 1980); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1978). But see Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976)
(expressly overruled in Agins). See generally Bowde, Legal Battles on the California Coast:
A Review of the Rules, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 273 (1974); Hall, Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in the Land Use Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569
(1977); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsi-
bility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3; Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging
the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1450-51 (1974).
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The judiciary and the United States Supreme Court have found it
impossible to establish a "'set formula' for determining when 'jus-
tice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain dis-
proportionately concentrated on a few persons. 32 When invoked,
the doctrine is justified on two quite, separate grounds. First, it is
based on the fairness ground that uncompensated takings victimize
a few for the benefit of the public. Second, it is justified on the
ground that compensation leads to more efficient or responsible
public decisionmaking. The following discussion shows that in the
context of suburban controls the fairness question is the only logi-
cal grounding for the compensation requirement and that fairness
requires protection in only a limited set of circumstances.
The Efficient or Responsible Public Decisionmaking Ratio-
nale.3 One rationale for requiring payments to the landowner is
that this will deter the "legislature from enacting inefficient pro-
grams." 4 By having to make a payment, the public officials may be
induced to "weigh more accurately the costs and benefits of alter-
native measures."3 5 The difficulty with this justification is the same
one we have seen with regard to subsidies generally. First, while
this type of payment may deter the local government from over-
valuing the harm to the community occasioned by growth, it may
just as easily cause the local decisionmakers to undervalue that
harm. They may look at their short-term fiscal problems or the
upcoming election rather than the long-term costs to the commu-
nity and decide not to make purchases. Again, the present taxpay-
ers only represent a portion of all those future residents who will
derive utility from the land use configuration, and irreversible en-
vironmental harms may result. Second, for efficient local decision-
making, the question is not whether the local government actually
pays the landowner the amount required to make him change his
allocation decisions or even the amount of unexpected, unrisked
losses actually visited upon him, but rather whether the govern-
ment has taken into account these factors when they made their
cost benefit calculus of the desirability of the change. As long as
32 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (Brennan, J.).
'33 See generally B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Dunham, A Legal and
Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958); Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
681, 693-99 (1973). For other authorities, see id. at 682 n.2.
3' Ellickson, supra note 1, at 420.
35 Id.
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the overall gains flowing from the government action exceed the
losses occasioned by it, it will be a social benefit irrespective of
whether the gains are shared among winners and losers. The pro-
ductive efficiency3" will be the same whether those payments are
made or not, so long as the amounts are visible. In the setting of
local government where the private landowners hold the major
housing resource and tend to have a vast array of legal and politi-
cal capabilities, it would seem that such private evaluations would
be extremely visible.
There is, however, another set of reasons for requiring either in-
validation or compensation, and that is the unfairness of victimiz-
ing certain landowners for the common good.
The Fairness Rationale.37 The Constitution contains a variety of
doctrines which are designed to insure that government, acting for
the common good, does not unreasonably intrude into the rights of
individuals. The equal protection clause, the due process clause
and the taking clause all are designed to insure that groups of peo-
ple in roughly the same situation will be treated similarly and that
basic freedoms protecting human integrity are not interfered with.
The citizen is given different protection depending upon the char-
acter of the right invaded. In some situations (such as right to pro-
creation or right to citizenship), the rights are so fundamental that
the legal system will not allow the government to invade them ex-
cept in cases of compelling need. In other situations they may be
invaded only if the government pays the injured person his subjec-
tive value of that right. In still other situations they may be in-
vaded only if the objective or market value of the right is paid.
The taking doctrine applies primarily to situations where a
traditional property interest has been invaded. By the wording of
the clause itself, "just compensation" is made a substitute for the
right involved. The difficult problem is to distinguish when there
has been an unexpected loss of a property right occasioned by the
government action, from a loss in property value where the land-
owner priced in the risk of such government action, purchased that
36 See Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers' Surplus, 8 REv. ECON. STUD. 108, 111-12
(1940), and for a general discussion, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation!' Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165,
1177-78 (1967).
37 See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Berger,
The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power:
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021
(1975); Michelman, supra note 36.
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risk in the land marketplace, and had no legitimate expectation of
any one governmental outcome. While one can think of examples
of either situation (e.g., the purchaser of a house would not expect
to have to share his bed with the local postman, but the purchaser
of the local trucking company might well expect regulatory policy
to change), it is important to examine the suburban land market to
see what would constitute an unfair victimizing of landowners.
To understand this, it is necessary to look at the types of losses
which occur in the growth control setting and then to explore how
these may either be surprises or priced-in risks. We begin by con-
sidering how owners of vacant land price their investment. Rural
land susceptible to development derives market value above that
from agricultural use in direct proportion to its potential for urban
development. That locational advantage is due to the positive ex-
ternal effect of the first builders of the city (both public and pri-
vate) who build their homes, put in their streets and schools, and
develop their businesses. The increase in market value of this po-
tential development land is due not to productive investment, such
as when an owner of capital goods innovates and invests time and
energy in making an asset more productive, but rather is due to
the increased expectation that the parcel will have a higher value
in urban use than in rural use. No inefficiencies or disincentives
automatically result when development is denied."' What is impor-
tant to observe about the increase in market value due to develop-
mental potential is that the expectations are not formed in a vac-
uum but, in fact, include expectations concerning government
action that influence that potential. The land market investor pays
a sum which will be higher or lower depending upon the certainty
of expectation.
Assume that the landowners purchase their land in a world
where there is a large sign reading, "Buy land here; all landowners
please pay price for land on basis that government will allow you
to develop as you please. No government jackpots allowed." In
such a world, the market value for undeveloped land would include
a full capitalization of this certainty of expectation plus a price
11 In a world of sensitive ecological values and rapidly changing costs of local services, the
ability to develop land, as opposed to the ability to use it in the present or natural state,
may be the type of resource which Professor Michelman refers to when he says that com-
pensation is not required if a "tacit understanding has arisen, that society reserves the right
to preempt the exploitation of a certain narrowly described class of resources at any time,
and that no one is to form any inconsistent expectations about the future use and control of
those resources." Michelman, supra note 36, at 1240. See id., at 1208-13.
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reflecting whatever other uncertainties there may be concerning
the bank rate, the national economy, the local economy, etc. Nowimagine a second world where the sign reads, "Buy land here; all
landowners please pay price on basis that government will allow
you some reasonable return and a few of you will hit the jackpot."
Again, the landowner would price in this expectation. Presumably,
he would pay less in such a world for his property than he would if
he had the very high degree of certainty of yield that he had in the
first world, but this would of course depend on how big the jackpot
was. Finally, let us move to a third world where the sign reads,
"Land Lottery-buy ticket here (losing ticket holders receive noth-
ing)."'39 Again, the land buyer would price in his expected windfall
should he win, and the cost of the ticket would be considerably less
than would the price for the identical land in the first example. So
long as the land buyer knows the rules of the game when he buys,
it is fair that he keeps his gains if he wins or that he not receive
any money for losing. Such an extra payment would be a subsidy
rather than restitution or compensation; though if such windfalls
were common, land prices would rise to the level of the second sit-
uation to take them into account.
We can now understand that the fairness question of whether to
tax gains or compensate losses only arises when a government ac-
tion represents a completely unforeseen risk not reflected in the
marketplace.40 If the land market capitalizes complete certainty of
government action and the government then surprises all investors,
it would seem fair for the government which caused these unex-
pected windfall gains and losses to reverse this capricious redistri-
bution. In such a situation of complete certainty, the measure of
damages would be equal to the reduction in market value of the
land. However, in a land market where it is known that the govern-
ment may have to act to deal with the increasing marginal costs of
new entrants or produce a new product, or even attempt to be a
19 "Since I got exactly what I meant to buy, it perhaps can be said that society has ef-
fected no redistribution so far as I am concerned, any more than it does when it refuses to
refund the price of my losing sweepstakes ticket." Michelman, supra note 36, at 1238.
10 Note the most extreme example of the use of the police power by a local government in
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). There the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld wetlands regulations which restricted use to natural use because, in part,
the owners should not have had any expectations of being able to fill land to build their
cottage within state shorelands subject to the public trust doctrine. "The exercise of the
police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of
that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its
natural uses." Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
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monopolist, the decrease in market value will simply represent the
bargained-for risk and no damages are required on fairness
grounds. One can even imagine a situation where the government's
action is a surprise beyond even that foreseeable range of risk. In
such a situation it would be fair to award damages, but only to the
extent the value of the parcel is reduced below what a "losing"
parcel would have been worth after the government acted within
the foreseeable range of risk.
Thus the individual who must decide these damages, for exam-
ple a judge who is looking at a downzoning, must make an empiri-
cal judgment concerning the nature of the land market in the sub-
urb and the range of priced-in risks of government behavior. It is
not surprising that in American suburbs over the last twenty years
judges have come to the conclusion that land market investors
know about the threat of government action and are in need of
compensation in only the most unusual of circumstances.41
The Regional Analysis: An Efficiency Criterion
The previous subsection has explored why a suburb might want
to control its growth, the tools available to it and the transitional
equity problems present when it changes its package of controls.
The problem now is to expand the model so that it will tell us
what the impact of the suburbs' actions in concert will be through-
out the metropolitan region.
The Mechanics of Regional Competition
One can start from the premise that housing consumers
purchase a housing bundle that includes a variety of ingredients.
These include not only the number of bedrooms or size of the yard,
but also the locational advantages of the site. These locational ad-
vantages include both saved transportation costs to and from the
workplace and shopping areas, and the particular group of external
costs and benefits peculiar to the site. 2 Since individuals will make
a tradeoff between savings in location costs and transportation
costs to the city center, one finds a metropolitan area arranged and
expanding in generally a circular manner. For the individual hous-
"I E.g., id.; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237
(1975). The same may be said for owners or purchasers of historic buildings. See, e.g., Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
" See note 11 supra.
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ing consumer this means that he will pay more per square foot for
the more accessible sites. This results generally in a higher price
for residential space on a square foot basis in the more central ar-
eas as compared to the outlying areas. Graphically this would look
like Figure I, which shows the Residential Land Value (expressed
in dollar rent per square foot) as a function of distance from the
city center.
FIGURE I
RESIDENTIAL RENT GRADIENT
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Square $10
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Miles
Central Distance Outlying
Business Suburbs
District
The group of households that want lower density (more space)
will be encouraged to take advantage of the lower location rent of
more removed sites. Aside from very peculiar circumstances of
some people with a high preference for avoiding transportation
costs, those people who value large quantities of residential space
will tend to reside in the areas where there are large location sav-
ings. One sees that suburban areas will naturally tend to attract
high income households where transportation costs are far out-
weighed by residential space consumption preferences. Alonso and
Muth use this general framework to explain the empirical reality of
the aggregated distribution of residential densities with its declin-
ing land prices away from the city center and the related tendency
of higher income families to live further from the center, that is, to
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live in the suburbs.43
The suburban housing market will tend to be dominated by a
group of consumers who place a higher value on residential space
than on avoiding transportation costs. If we are looking at the sub-
urban housing market as a whole, the possible consumers are, be-
cause of the high transportation costs to the suburbs, those who
value space-the single-family home with attached yard being the
archetypal residence. The central city areas will tend to have low-
income residents who would have to spend larger proportions of
their income on transportation if they lived in the suburbs. Instead
of paying these transportation costs, they crowd into very small
spaces and pay very high rents on a square foot basis. Still, these
rents are, as a proportion of income, less than the transportation
costs of coming into the city from the suburbs. The first radial of
suburbs would tend to contain the middle-income groups who can
pay more for transport (but a smaller proportion of their income).
The outermost. concentric zone would tend to have the highest in-
come group who can afford high transportation costs and who want
residential space which will be much cheaper on a square foot basis
than the downtown land. Again this can be shown graphically,
drawing upon Harris and Ullman's concentric zone concept as
shown in Figure II.
'3 See R. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969). See also W. ALONso, LOCATION AND LAND
USE: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF LAND RENT (1964); Alonso, A Theory of the Urban
Land Market, 7 PAPERS & PROC. REGIONAL SCI. A. 191 (1961)
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FIGURE II
CONCENTRIC ZONES OF METROPOLITAN AREAS*
1. Central Business District
2. Zone of Transition
3. Zone of Workingmen's Homes
4. Zone of Better Residences
in Suburbs
5. Commuters Zone
Assume that in our metropolitan area there are fifty suburban
municipalities ranging from middle-income out to high-income
suburbs. Housing in these suburbs comes either from an upgrading
of older housing stock or from the building of new units on con-
verted rural land. As these suburbs use up their supply of rural
land, new suburbs will be formed on the fringe to supply more land
for conversion. Thus, for the metropolitan area as a whole, we can
assume quite an elastic supply of new land. This seems logical so
*Harris & Ullman, The Nature of Cities, 242 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLMrCAL & SOc. SCi.,
Nov. 1945, at 13.
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long as the technology of transportation continues to improve or
workplaces tend to spread out from the central cities (again in a
radial manner), and the governments willingly provide services."
By analogy to the theory of the firm, each suburb can be seen as a
production unit of suburban housing with more units entering the
market as other units reach their maximum size or capacity for
production.
If the external impacts of growth in such a world are momen-
tarily ignored, the suburb has only two reasons for intervening: to
produce a different product, or to extract monopoly profits by arti-
ficially limiting supply. The worry is, of course, that it will attempt
the latter, but as we noted, it is difficult to determine its motive.
Even if monopoly is the motivation, it is, as we shall see, not neces-
sarily correct to conclude that such monopoly behavior represents
a social loss.
Let us examine what will happen if all of these suburbs, in any
given concentric ring, are completely fungible, and one of them at-
tempts to cap housing production or impose excessive charges. In
such a situation, the housing consumer will simply switch to an-
other suburb that is not attempting such a tactic. In the case of
perfect competition, there will be no possibility of exacting any
consumer surplus out of these suburban house buyers. There will,
however, be the possibility of exacting some of the producers' sur-
plus because the landowner in one suburb cannot move to another
suburb with his land. This will not affect the efficiency of the hous-
ing production for the suburb or the region. It does affect those
landowners who might have been hoping for a little profit. But as
we saw, if they knew of the risk, there is no fairness reason for
compensating them.
Second, let us examine what would happen if all suburbs were
taken over by one cartel of landowners who could limit all produc-
tion and all access to the creation of new suburbs. In such a situa-
tion there could be monopoly profits and fewer houses produced."
However, since we are looking at an entire metropolitan group of
suburbs, such an eventuality is quite remote in the American met-
ropolitan region with its myriad local governments. It would be ex-
tremely unlikely that the entire metropolitan unit would come
" See generally Note, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs: Policy Formulation and
the Constitutionality of Municipal Growth Restricting Plans, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 803,
812-13 (1976).
4' For an attempt to empirically validate such regionwide monopoly, see Hamilton, Zon-
ing and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URB. EcoN. 116 (1978).
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under one monopolizing group of voters. Even Professor Ellickson
acknowledges that "each metropolitan area is likely to contain
some true 'tight little islands' that are permanently and steadfastly
exclusionary. ... Its central city and some of its larger and less
elite suburbs, however, are usually vulnerable to developer influ-
ence, and many of its middle-class suburbs may occasionally be
manipulable. ' 46 There are a variety of reasons why this would
seem to be true. The technology of transportation is improving, so
new potential suburbs will continue to open up. The new spread of
jobs to the suburbs should further increase the creation of new
housing producing suburbs.
The problem then is the situation in which some of the suburbs
have something unique about them and some of them on occasion
attempt to exploit this uniqueness to increase their "profits" in the
form of exactions or increased amenities. Typical of these suburbs
would be those that have an outstanding library or an excellent
school system.
In such a situation, the individual suburban government might
find itself in the position of being able to influence the price of
housing produced within its borders. Since its output decisions
have an influence on price, we can say that such a suburb has local
market power. We know that if we were looking at only one mar-
ket, price would exceed marginal cost, leading to an inefficient use
of resources. However, here we are looking at fifty-plus suburbs,
and we can see that there will be possible costs, but these may not
be social costs if they result in other efficiencies. The unique sub-
urb will produce less housing than it would under competitive situ-
ations, and there will be a local cost equivalent to the amount of
consumers' surplus that is spent on the higher priced housing
within that suburb. But the impact does not stop there.
Three things will occur within the regional suburban housing
market. First, consumers will have to substitute less desirable
housing in other non-unique suburbs. These other suburbs will fill
the shortfall in housing units. Second, seeing the potential for mo-
nopoly profits, other suburbs will attempt to duplicate these
unique circumstances. Third, more suburbs may come into exis-
tence to provide either more housing or uniqueness. That is, the
suburb down the ring somewhere will build its own superlative li-
brary or its own sailing park in an attempt to raise its housing
prices. Since entry to the provision of suburban housing is not re-
" Ellickson, supra note 1, at 409.
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strained, there will come a point at which a long-run equilibrium
results from the entry of so many competing suburbs that no fur-
ther opportunities for making a supranormal profit remain. For all
suburbs that engage in this competition, the average total cost of
housing will be somewhat higher than it need be if there were per-
fect competition, but that cost will reflect the cost of exploiting the
uniqueness of these suburbs.4 7 The issue then is whether the bene-
fits of such differentiation to those new entrants or to the commu-
nity outweigh the costs.
To answer that question we have to explore this notion of a se-
ries of producers having a degree of control over the price of their
product but subject to competition from more or less imperfect
substitutes. The forces at work in such a market are called by
economists "monopolistic competition. 48 The important factor in
such a situation is the character of the uniqueness which the sub-
urb is exploiting. Such uniqueness has been defined by Ellickson as
"unique topographic or cultural features, that offer unusual public
services, or that have special locational advantages. 4 9 What is im-
portant to observe about this definition is that, with the exception
of location, each of these examples of a competitive advantage is
exploited by extra productive effort on the part of the municipality
rather than any capture of limited resources. Locational advantage
is, however, different, for it is not within the productive control of
the municipality. However, if we agree that it is politically impossi-
ble for a suburb to take over an entire concentric ring of a metro-
politan area then this type of uniqueness exploitation will not oc-
cur, and the specific location within a band will not give the
suburb exploitable uniqueness.
For the most part, the other "unique" community aspects are
ones that the suburb itself creates through either its regulatory,
tax or expenditure powers. For instance, there will be a number of
communities at various distances from the city center with a vari-
ety of things that make them geographically special (lake views or
beaches, etc.). Such communities will exploit these resources
through their public decisions concerning how to use them (e.g.,
deciding that the canal front property should be in residential, not
industrial, use). Similarly, cultural features or public services such
17 See generally J. DuE & R. CLOWER, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMic ANALYSIS 218-39 (4th ed.
1961).
48 See generally E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (3d ed.
1938).
49 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 430.
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as a good school system or the finest library in the world or the
best park in the city are all unique features which are developed
by the municipality itself. This type of product differentiation does
not cause allocative inefficiency in the long run but is rather a way
to make a better product. It is in fact the transformation of the
housing package itself. The question to explore is whether govern-
ment efficiency can be created by allowing suburbs to exploit these
differences, for if efficiency is possible, then such differentiation of
suburbs should be encouraged.
The Introduction of Externalities and Public Goods
To determine whether there is a good reason to allow such com-
petition among suburbs, one must look to the public goods that
these suburbs provide and the externalities they seek to control.
The setting of standards for negative externalities and the
amounts publicly paid for positive externalities or public goods is
extremely complicated, and since I have promised to provide a
modest model, I will fall back on some very well worn paths, prin-
cipally those of Professors Tiebout and Buchanan.50 We know from
the discussion in this article's first section, Economic Reasons for
Growth Control, that the suburb is in a quandary. When the scat-
tered group of citizens first incorporate, its average cost in provid-
ing various services is quite high on a per resident basis (e.g., the
first resident would have to pay the entire cost of the first life-
guard's salary). The marginal costs will go down for a time as the
suburb grows and begins to have some economies of scale (e.g.,
buying swimsuits for twenty lifeguards is cheaper than buying one
suit). However, we know that at some point the individual suburb
is going to have decreasing marginal benefits from growth. Thus,
its old normal regulatory or tax rules may become increasingly
costly.
In most situations where government is taxing and dispensing
public goods, there is no way of measuring the public's valuing of
them aside from votes. However, for our suburban housing market
this is not one government, but rather fifty-plus suburbs each of
which sets its own package of public goods which includes outright
public expenditures, and also sets the balance between an individ-
ual suburban member's desires to maximize his own share of the
50 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); Buchanan,
An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
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goods while having those goods delivered at the lowest per capita
average cost. That is, the suburbs resemble a market where public
goods are "privatized" on a regional basis. The citizens in these
suburbs have two ways of registering their preferences on these
matters. They can vote-for the local city council or they can choose
a different suburb.
Tiebout has constructed a model based on this simple fact,
showing that there is indeed a very good reason for allowing sub-
urbs to differentiate themselves and provide different bundles of
public goods. Tiebout makes seven assumptions for his model: (1)
consumer-voters are fully mobile; (2) they have full knowledge of
municipal packages; (3) there are large numbers of municipalities;
(4) there are no employment restrictions; (5) public goods packages
exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communi-
ties; (6) every community has an optimum size; and (7) communi-
ties below the optimum size will attract new residents to lower av-
erage costs, and communities above the optimum size will seek to
reduce the number of residents, and those at optimum size will
stay the same." Tiebout concludes from his model that housing
consumers will tend to force the local governments toward opti-
mum public goods packages by voicing and voting their wishes for
efficient combinations of city size and public goods scale at the lo-
cal level, and on the regional level by moving to and voting in sub-
urbs that have preferred packages.
The optimum package of public goods for some suburbs may be
few members and very low provision of public expenditures. The
high-income suburb may function best for its members where most
services are private (e.g., private schools and garbage pickup) and
there are few members partaking in the relatively high cost ameni-
ties (e.g., a beach with many lifeguards or gardens with many gar-
deners).52 Tiebout concludes that an integration of municipal gov-
ernments would thus lead to a less responsive vehicle for
establishing public goods levels. By analogy, any rules that engen-
dered homogeneity of suburban public goods packages would simi-
larly be unjustified on economic grounds. A series of suburbs in
which some can set lids on their size while others grow, or where
some have very high costs for amenities while others have low, is
thus much more desirable from the vantage point of the allocation
5 Tiebout, supra note 50, at 419-20.
2 This type of situation is analogous to the one discussed earlier, notes 10-12 & accompa-
nying text supra, where suburb residents' preferences differ substantially from general soci-
etal preferences.
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of government expenditures or the setting of congestion cost levels
than is a series of suburbs growing as they have grown before with
a uniform level of expansion. The granting of this power to exploit
uniqueness does in fact promote efficiency in both the long and the
short run.53
There are two important points to make about this model. First,
in order to insure that this system functions effectively, local deci-
sionmakers, house builders and house buyers who make their pref-
erences known all must have as close to perfect information as pos-
sible. The information requirement can be met through a
decisionmaking system which brings forward all available informa-
tion and allows all potential consumers (i.e., housing residents who
can vote or move) to participate to the extent their wealth lets
them. Thus, one could devise rules that would make sure that all
potential consumers could avail themselves of real estate brokerage
services, or rules which guarantee open hearings and reasoned de-
liberation when the municipality changes its control package.
Second, people can only participate in this system to the extent
their wealth allows. This fact will result in a series of efficient sub-
urbs, but it will also mean that poor people will "prefer" 54 to live
in the center city in overcrowded conditions because of the low
transportation costs.
The Impact of the Property Tax: The Case for Intervention on
Distributional Grounds
We now have- a model which explains some of the relevant fac-
tors in the suburban housing market. We saw earlier that unless all
suburbs are somehow taken over by one centralized monopolist,
there are no efficiency problems with letting individual unique sub-
urbs attempt to exert market power by differentiating themselves
through their regulation, tax measures or establishment of local
packages of public goods, so long as the cost of that exploitation
serves some social purpose.
We also considered why it might in fact be advantageous for mu-
nicipalities to engage in such differentiation since it would lead to
a region-wide improvement in the valuing of public goods (in this
'3 See generally E. MILLS & W. OATES, FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS: THE
ECONOMIC ISSUES (1975); Dowall, Fiscal Impact Rationale for Local Growth Management,
12 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 83 (1978).
"' Obviously, poor people's preferences for suburban space are limited by their lack of
wealth.
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case, congestion cost valuing and public expenditure valuing). This
part of the model showed that allowing variations in municipal
packages of control and tax, and radical rearrangements in those
packages to meet increasing marginal costs of new entrants would
be much preferable (on efficiency grounds only) to forcing the sub-
urbs to any standardized packages, such as leaving them with their
present set of controls and taxes. While there may be some distri-
butional problems with surprising the "unlucky" landowners, there
do not appear to be any efficiency problems.
We now have one final factor which we can add into this set of
hypotheses: the impact of an ad valorem property tax.5 Up to this
point we have ignored the fact that these suburbs employ a prop-
erty tax based on land wealth and distribute the proceeds on an
equal basis to all local residents by providing police and fire pro-
tection, and education. The question now is how does our model
react to the addition of this important factor? 5
Let us examine one of our suburbs located at some distance from
the city center. We know that there will be only a certain group of
potential consumers who value residential space higher than trans-
port costs and whose transport costs make up a small enough por-
tion of their income to allow them to live there. Assume that we
have a suburb that has homeowners whose homes range from
$75,000 to $100,000 in market value. To the extent that property
tax assessments are a valid indication of these values, then the
home owner with a $100,000 house will pay more money into the
suburban coffers than will the person with the $75,000 house. If all
these revenues are spread equally among the population of the
suburb (i.e., in the form of equally accessible public goods like
5' Because of Proposition 13 and the Serrano decision, much of the following analysis
may not apply to California. Proposition 13, the 1978 amendment to the California Consti-
tution, CAL. CONST. art. 13A, put a limit on the rate of tax that any municipality may apply
to local property. This would appear to limit the ability of the municipalities to charge
varying tax prices for different packages of public services. However, the California munici-
palities have been very inventive in their use of benefit or user charges, or taxes, which may
allow for differential prices between municipalities. Secondly, the California Supreme Court
decision in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (reserv-
ing and remanding); 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 929 (1976) (appeal from the
decision on remand), further complicates matters by mandating some uniformity of per pu-
pil expenditure in the public schools, thus limiting the local school board (which sometimes
follow local government boundaries) in the discretion they have to vary public education
packages.
" See generally Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis,
77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969).
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parks, streets and schools), the tax will effect a redistribution of
wealth from the owners of the more expensive to the owners of the
less expensive homes.
Let us now see what happens when our suburb lets in ten new
families whose income allows them to live there (in this case those
that can afford $75,000 or $100,000 houses). If the prices of the ten
new houses are spread out between $75,000 and $100,000 in the
same way as the existing housing stock, then the proportional tax
burden on the established residents is unchanged. Note, however,
what happens if all of the ten units are of the $75,000 character.
There will be-ten more family consumers of public goods, but only
a $750,000 increase in the tax base. Thus, the existing owners of
$100,000 units will either have to accept a slightly lower output of
services or agree to raise the local tax rate which will take more
from the $100,000 unit owner than from the $75,000 unit owners.
The reverse would of course happen if the community built ten of
the $100,000 units adding $1,000,000 to the tax base and only ten
new families. We see then that the property tax encourages all sub-
urbs to set the per unit value of new units at or above the average
value of the existing housing stock.57
The next question is whether, on a regional basis, the suburbs
can in fact get away with pricing the new unit value above the ex-
isting average value. It would seem that they can exclude the less
than average priced structure, but would have difficulty in pushing
the average cost of the new units much above the built stock aver-
age. This is because every housing consumer wants to cash in on
the "free ride" afforded by higher priced housing in the neighbor-
hood. In our example, if the suburb set all ten units at $100,000,
the prospective buyers would rather go to the "f~mcier suburb"
next door where the house unit prices are in the range of $100,000
to $150,000. The end result then would be a tendency toward strat-
ification of suburbs by house value.
Once we see that the property tax will act as a price for public
services and that any variation in property valuation will result in
redistributions between relatively rich and relatively poor subur-
ban residents, a great deal of insight is gained concerning exclu-
sionary policies embodied in suburbs' regulatory and tax provi-
sions. In such a world there will be suburbs that cater to various
67 Some states explicitly recognize the maintenance of the property tax base as a legiti-
mate purpose of local zoning and growth control ordinances. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
§ 11-13-1 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2603, 4903, 6904 (1975). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1457-58 (1978).
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income households and that eliminate the possibility of redistribu-
tion of income inside the local suburban community. This does not
suggest that there will be any efficiency problems with this mass of
suburbs catering to a series of income related tastes. On the con-
trary, the suburbs will be quite efficient08 The only possible effi-
ciency relevance of this model is that this one criterion, keeping a
uniform price on public services within the suburb (through the
mechanism of uniformly priced houses), may overwhelm other
variables and distort the decisionmaking of the municipality.
The distribution problem is of substantial significance. Income
redistribution from the rich homeowner to the poorer homeowner
or tenant is accomplished not only by the actual expenditure on
public goods, but also by a series of transfers that are difficult to
monetize, such as being able to go to school with children whose
parents are very good at making a school district spend their
money effectively. The lower income groups who could afford the
added transportation costs will be unable to find a place in the
suburbs where they might have some wealth redistributed to them
through the mechanism of the property tax. Similarly, the high in-
come groups will be able to insulate their major form of equity
(their houses) from such redistribution. They will be able to live in
efficient local jurisdictions and avoid wealth transfers effected
through the local public sector. Thus, the combination of a series
of suburban governments and the property tax creates a situation
where suburbs are virtually prohibited from redistributing in-
come.59 This may or may not be a good thing, depending on one's
normative preferences for the level of government which is best
able to accomplish wealth redistribution.
18 See Hamilton, Property Taxation's Incentive to Fiscal Zoning, in PROPERTY TAX RE-
FORM 125 (G. Peterson ed. 1973). See also Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the In-
visible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483
(1973).
'9 This will be true so long as the property tax is a local property tax; that is, as long as
the tax revenue collected in one community is spent for the benefit of that community.
Some of the literature dealing with the California school finance case of Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (reversing and remanding); 18 Cal. 3d
728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976) (appeal from the decision on remand), and its
progeny has suggested the possibility of a statewide property tax apportioned to local gov-
ernments on a per capita or other relevant basis. See, e.g., Wise, School Finance Equaliza-
tion Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. AcT. 123 (1971). If this
type of property tax system were adopted, it would naturally lead to wealth redistribution
since each individual would receive the same amount of money (allocated to his municipal
government) regardless of how much property tax he had paid. See generally Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HA~v.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (1972).
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The focus on the regional housing market when coupled with the
property tax impact brings out a secondary distributional impact.
Not only does the suburban resident of one of the outer concentric
rings insulate himself from negative wealth distributions, but he
also often manages to get a positive wealth distribution from the
taxpayers in the center city. This is because he can commute into
the central city and demand high levels of services from the central
city, thus raising the costs of that city's services. He then flees
back to the suburb, avoiding any property taxes which go towards
these expenditures. These costs may be offset to some degree by
other tax mechanisms (such as sales taxes or employment taxes)e0
and by the distribution of non-residential property tax base (e.g.,
business structures), but the general picture is one of higher in-
come suburban residents receiving a wealth transfer from lower in-
come central city residents. 1 This may or may not be a good thing,
but it certainly is relevant when considering a system of giving
some of these lower income residents positive wealth transfers by
letting them live in the suburbs.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GROWTH CONTROLS
Our purpose in designing the model outlined above was to help
us better understand the production of housing in an urban re-
gional market and, more specifically, the justifications for and the
effect of various types of growth controls imposed by suburban
municipalities. Equipped with this understanding and based on
the conclusions drawn from the model, we may now proceed to a
discussion of the judical review of growth controls.
We turn then to the courts, which are called upon to determine
whether a given system of growth controls is justified. We begin
with a critique of the "trust-busting" philosophy of Professor Rob-
ert Ellickson to which we have referred occasionally in the course
of this article. We will then discuss proposals which support the
present judicial approach to the issue of growth controls.
60 Whether sales and employment taxes aid in wealth redistribution or rather, compound
existing inequalities is dependent on whether most commercial and business establishments
are located in high- or low-income municipalities. For a discussion of this problem as it
relates to the sales tax, see Hagman, The Use of Boundary Lines to Discriminate in the
Provision of Services by Race, 54 U. DE'. J. URB. L. 849, 882-83 (1977).
61 See Nennan, Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: One City's Tale, 23 NAT'L
TAX J. 117 (1970).
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The Trustbuster's Fallacy: A Critique of the Recent Call for
State Constitutional Activism
At the beginning of this article, it was pointed out that Professor
Ellickson has called for a judicial reversal of the present presump-
tion of the validity of municipal land use policies.62 It is now ap-
propriate, in the context of the model we have developed, to ex-
amine briefly the effect of using his suggested legal rules. It should
be kept in mind that he would like to turn his suggested principles
into a constitutional mandate for state courts to actively pursue.
His proposed legal rules are summarized as follows:
(1) A suburb must be entitled to force restrictions (sometimes
cushioned by compensation) on landowners ....
(2) Injunctive relief is appropriate . . . against a municipal
program motivated by discrimination against ethnic or ideolog-
ical minorities.
(3) . . . When a government prohibits subnormal land uses, a
landowner should be required to prove that the prohibition is
grossly inefficient in order to recover for any resulting diminu-
tion in the value of his land.
(4) When a suburban restriction that dictates above-normal
landowner conduct substantially reduces the value of a per-
son's land, that person should receive compensation unless the
suburb can affirmatively prove that its restriction is both fair
to that landowner and efficient.
(5) . . . [D]evelopment charges designed to raise general rev-
enue or to "internalize" the congestion costs of growth should
be prohibited ...
(6) [D]evelopment charges levied on homebuilders to finance
a specific service should be permitted if the charges help equal-
ize the discounted net benefits each dwelling unit receives from
that service over time.. . . [D]evelopment charges even greater
in amount should be permissible if the municipality can prove
that they will both promote efficiency and enhance the long-
term self-interest of those interested in housing construction.
(7) . . . A landowner's compensation is determined by how
much the restriction reduces the market value of his land ...
tak[ing] into account the valid development charges and un-
compensated use restrictions that the suburb might have en-
acted ....
(8) Consumers should be entitled to recover (usually by class
action) any damages they have suffered as a result of a housing
2 See notes 4-5 & accompanying text supra.
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price increase attributable to a suburb's policies . .. [unless]
the suburb demonstrates that its growth controls are not only
efficient but also fair to them.63
While rules one through three merely follow present doctrine,
the cumulative impact of rules four through eight is to place the
suburb in a very different position from the one it presently enjoys.
Our model and economic analysis show that these suggested novel
rules both ignore capitalized expectations in the land market and
miss the welfare gains that are attainable through the differentia-
tion of suburbs. These two fundamental errors can be shown on a
rule-by-rule basis.
Rule four would force the municipality either to not attempt to
change its control package or force it to make an elaborate and
expensive defense of the "efficiency" of its change. As we know, the
suburb as it matures will reach a point where the marginal cost of
new entrants will begin to increase dramatically. To force the mu-
nicipality either to abandon any attempt to deal with the new en-
trants or to increase dramatically the economic, legal and adminis-
trative costs of imposing those costs would have disastrous
consequences. 4 The municipality would continue to accept a
stream of new entrants based on the now outdated "normal" set of
controls while its real costs increased with each new resident.
Growth would occur in these higher cost suburbs rather than the
least cost suburbs further removed from the city center and com-
paratively sparsely settled. Thus, all housing consumers as well as
all present residents would lose because the costs of providing the
package would, over the long run, be higher than necessary and the
ability of the suburbs to change the product to reflect current de-
mand would be similarly decreased.6 5 Most importantly, the sub-
urb that desires to establish a great library or public marina and
then to take advantage of that produced uniqueness would be pro-
hibited from doing so.
Rule five would have similar consequences. As our analysis has
shown, the new entrants bring a variety of costs to the suburb,
some of which occur in close proximity to their houses, while
others are felt throughout the community. If one is interested in
the efficient production of housing packages throughout the region,
"' Ellickson, supra note 1, at 468-69.
64 See generally Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining "Just Compensation," 21
STAN. L. REv. 693-701 (1969).
" The raising of local taxes to pay for such a compensatory scheme is a political if not
legal impossibility. See note 27 supra.
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one should steer development to the least-cost housing producer
suburbs. To do this, one must "internalize" the congestion costs of
the new entrants in order to place a price on development in that
community. Thus this rule is clearly not efficient and its only pos-
sible justification is the equity ground of avoiding wealth distribu-
tions from unrepresented outsiders to overrepresented insiders.
This justification seems spurious since if there is in fact a competi-
tive group of suburbs, the insiders will not be able to set the price
of entry any higher than the actual costs of that entry. In those
admittedly few situations where monopoly power is present, the
rule would still not seem to be justified unless it could be shown
that the efficiency of the entire regional system of housing provi-
sion and the efficiency of local government are outweighed by this
one local monopoly. Presumably, such cases would be so rare that
no general rule should be formulated around them.
Rule six does at least allow the costing of the harm the new en-
trants occasion in close proximity to their dwelling, but its restric-
tion concerning the equalization of net benefits would again dra-
matically decrease the efficiency of the housing delivery. As our
analysis showed, the equal treatment norm only requires that all
newcomers be treated the same throughout the region, not that
newcomers and oldtimers within one suburb be treated similarly
over time. The costs of the first entrant are in fact lower than the
costs of the last entrant to an overcrowded suburb. Efficiency
would again point towards pricing the harm each new entrant oc-
casions in order to steer that new development to the least-cost
provider at any point in time.
Rule seven is clearly erroneous except in those situations where
the land market investor makes his decision in a situation of com-
plete certainty of expectation of government land policy. Since this
situation does not appear to have existed anywhere in the United
States during the last twenty-five years, the rule would seem to be
of little value.
Rule eight would again deter municipalities from making needed
changes in their growth control packages and would thus decrease
the efficiency of the overall system. Even if one did want to com-
pensate the consumers on equity grounds in situations of monop-
oly, the correct formula for damages would be the amount the con-
sumers pay in higher housing costs minus the amount they save by
having both a more efficient system of local government and a
more diverse selection of housing package products. Presumably
either rule seven or eight would be impossible to apply in actuality
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because of the tremendous problems of proof in the setting of a
multiplicity of impacts on housing costs and local government
efficiency. 6
Some Conclusions and Proposals
By combining the model's conclusions with a set of normative
judgments which seem to have reasonable acceptance in present
judicial thinking, we can gain a measure of insight into the present
legal approach to suburban growth control. The model itself leads
one to a series of conclusions concerning both the efficiency and
the distributional impacts of the controls. It shows that the sub-
urbs' use of their tax and police powers can only lead to ineffi-
ciency in two situations: (1) cases of pure monopoly with no new
suburban housing producers being allowed entry; and (2) situations
in which the suburbs cannot compete with each other in setting
optimum bundles of public goods and externalities packages. It
does show how the general efficiency of this quasi-market can be
helped through the provision of information for decisionmakers,
market mobility for consumers and open information processes for
investors. Turning to the distributive impact, it shows that there
will be two important sets of people whose interests should be con-
sidered. First, there is the landowner who may be affected by the
use of those powers in a way that was not included as a priced-in
risk of the investment over time. The second type of person is the
potential resident who could afford the transportation costs to the
suburb but who is precluded from receiving positive wealth redis-
tributions because of the use of controls to keep new structure
prices at average-built stock prices.
One can then combine these conclusions with a set of value
choices which, in this author's opinion, reflect current judicial
thinking. These choices concerning distributional justice and the
judicial role are as follows:
(1) Individuals should receive compensation for losses occa-
sioned by unpriced risks except in situations where the individual
would agree that a policy of refusing compensation in such in-
stances would promote his welfare in the long run."
(2) Non-arbitrary wealth redistribution from higher income to
" The class action system Ellickson proposes may be procedurally defective and unrealis-
tic. See Willemsen & Phillips, supra note 12, at 138-40.
47 See Michelman, supra note 36.
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lower income people has positive value.
(3) Seen in the context of the progressivity of our national in-
come tax and the present level of class, income and racial residen-
tial segregation, local governments are good vehicles for redistrib-
uting wealth, particularly non-monetized public goods.6 8
(4) The courts are not a competent institution to make and
monitor massive structural political reorganizations. 9
(5) Courts are a good institution for keeping local political in-
stitutions within their own procedural rules of operation."°
(6) In situations where political minorities working within the
political process are precluded from receiving wealth redistribu-
tions, the courts can provide certain limited amounts of such redis-
tributions so long as they do not make too large a tradeoff at the
expense of efficiency.7 1
(7) The state courts are better situated to deal with local distri-
bution problems than are the federal courts. 2
The conclusions drawn from the model and the normative value
choices lead to a generalized set of legal policy guidelines which in
turn can be distilled further into legal rules which bear a striking
similarity to the present judicial approach.
A Set of Policy Guidelines
The policy guidelines that would follow are:
(1) In a metropolitan region with many suburbs, there are no
efficiency grounds for interfering with an individual suburb's
use of its powers so long as all households/consumers can par-
ticipate in the quasi-market and all decisionmaking is based on
adequate information.
68 Many economists would disagree. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FI-
NANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1973).
" Both courts and commentators have reached similar conclusions. The Petaluma court,
522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), noted: "Being neither a super
legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is without authority to weigh and
appraise the factors considered or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged
zoning regulation. The reasonableness, not the wisdom of the Petaluma Plan is at issue in
this suit." Id. at 906 (footnote omitted). See also Rose, supra note 1, at 17-21.
70 See Fasano v. Board of Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
7' See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975).
7' Federal courts have generally been more reluctant than state courts to invalidate local
growth controls. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See generally Note, Zoning Growth Controls for
the General Welfare, 55 NEH. L. REV. 523 (1976).
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Irrespective of whether the suburbs set normal, below-normal or
.above-normal regulatory standards or charges, or even change
those standards or charges, there will be no long term allocative
inefficiency resulting from this action. Such actions should be al-
lowed because in the quasi-market setting the series of competing
suburbs will reach a long term equilibrium with resulting optimum
packages of standards, public goods and sizes of housing producing
communities. Less than optimum allocations could occur only in
two situations where the pricing mechanism for the whole system
was interfered with. First, this could occur when the entire metro-
politan area was monopolized by existing residents and there was a
limit on entry of new suburbs, and a lack of transportation im-
provements. The second situation would be one where there was
an artificial restriction on the suburbs' powers to change their tax
and regulatory packages.
(2) There are efficiency reasons for insuring that all potential
households/consumers can participate in the quasi-market and
that all public and private decisionmaking be based on as accu-
rate information as possible.
The quasi-market will only function efficiently when all poten-
tial consumers can register their preferences by either voting or by
moving. The decisionmaking of the consumers, the public deci-
sionmakers and the private housing providers can only reflect the
true demand and the true costs where information is as perfect as
possible. Participation in the market and information in the mar-
ketplace can be assured by a variety of institutional rules. These
rules would allow participation (i.e., irrespective of race, sex, na-
tionality or other irrelevant variables) and encourge information
flows to consumers (e.g., freedom of information, environmental
impact assessments) and public decisionmakers (e.g., notice and
due process requirements).7 3 The rules would also provide informa-
tion for the private market housing producers (i.e., rules as to the
time and degree of certainty of reliance on government action).74
(3) There are distributional grounds for protecting "unlucky
73 On the importance of adequate information and procedures as a standard for judicial
review, see Henke, Judicial Review of Local Administrative Decisions in California, 10
U.S.F.L. Rav. 361 (1976).
7' Note here that the market analogue depends upon the private housing producer to
actually construct the housing. As long as that private producer knows the amount of risk in
any of his investment decisions he can capitalize that risk into his price setting. For the
efficient working of the market he just needs a rule, any rule, upon which to make his calcu-
lations. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the rule sets an early or late point in the development
process where he can rely with certainty on the profits from his investment.
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landowners," but only to the extent of the reduction in value of
their parcel below what a "losing" parcel would have been
worth under the expected state of risk of government action.
The compensatory remedy could either be in the form of
money damages or in the form of the right to use the land for
the "losing" parcel use.
The landowner who is taken completely by surprise by govern-
ment action and who has not capitalized such a risk in his land
market behavior should be protected on fairness grounds. In most
cases it is irrelevant to a landowner whether this protection takes
the form of some lessening of the standard (but not to the point of
the winning standard) or a cash payment. However, there may be
situations where the landowner has a high subjective value in his
own use of the parcel which can only be protected through the les-
sening of the standard.
(4) Because of the combination of the property tax and sub-
urbs' powers there are distributional grounds for higher levels
of government to mandate some percentage of lower-than-aver-
age-property-value new structures within all suburban jurisdic-
tions. This forced share, however, should never be large enough
to substantially impair the efficient operation of the quasi-mar-
ket among suburbs.
This conclusion is based on the judgment that local governments
are good vehicles for income redistribution and that high-income
households should not be able to insulate themselves from trans-
fers while enjoying the enhanced efficiency of the system. There
cannot be too large a number of these new entrants because each
tends to destroy the efficient operations of the quasi-market.
Before honing these policy judgments into legal rules, it is signif-
icant to observe that they can be carried out by institutions of gov-
ernment other than the courts. The state governments that have
established the suburban entities, given them their powers and al-
lowed their proliferation, have usually left them free to use their
powers without state level administrative review of their individual
proposals. While leaving the procedural supervision of the suburbs'
functioning to the courts, they have increased information availa-
bility by requiring environmental assessments and various admin-
istrative procedures. In order to decrease the impact of unexpected
controls on landowners, the states have experimented with com-
pensatory devices such as providing funds for open space acquisi-
tion and property tax advantages for various land uses such as ag-
riculture. Concerning the problems of below-average-structure-
value households, a number of states, such as Massachusetts with
[Vol. 55:441
SUBURBAN GROWTH CONTROL
its "anti-snob" zoning legislation,7 5 have made substantial innova-
tions. If one were a policy advisor to state governments, the policy
guidelines would point to the following advice: States should not
mandate regional metropolitan government or abolish the subur-
ban entities. States should explore the possibility of mandating
some forced share plans to further local wealth redistribution, but
not to such an extent as to destroy the efficiency of the whole
system.
A System of Legal Rules
The legal rules which can be distilled from the general policy
conclusions are strikingly similar to the present set of doctrines
that are currently being followed by both state and federal courts.
They are:
(1) There is a general presumption of the validity of a sub-
urb's use of its police and tax power.
The judiciary has been very deferential to local governments and
quite tolerant of a vast array of mechanisms which have allowed
new and different uses of the police and tax power. One can point
to a variety of examples of this deference. The federal courts and
in particular the Supreme Court have been loathe to review local
actions on any grounds, much less efficiency grounds, and have
been erecting standing obstacles to considerations of such review.7 '
A wide variety of mechanisms for flexibility, such as variances,
special exceptions,78 floating zones79 and PUDS 80 have been ap-
proved by the state courts. Similarly, the courts have allowed the
suburbs to move from the control of externalities as defined in the
traditional nuisance manner to more esoteric preservation.8 ' As
75 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1979). See also Note, Califor-
nia Lower Income Housing Policy: At Legislative and Judicial Crossroads, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 793 (1978).
7' For the general deferential judicial posture, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974). For standing issue, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For background
discussions, see D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 17-63 (1977); Sager, Insu-
lar Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and Forest City Enterprses, Inc., 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1373, 1376-1402 (1978); Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 485 (1976). For a pre-1955 discussion, see Johnson, Constitutional
Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 199 (1955).
7 E.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 28 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
71 E.g., In re O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957).
79E.g., Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 159 Conn. 1, 266 A.2d 396 (1969).
so E.g., Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
81 E.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974) (historic district);
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suburbs came to discover their marginal costs of growth, the courts
have legitimized regulatory schemes to control the speed of
growth82 as well as schemes to pass on the cost of public services to
new entrants.83 Finally, the courts' reluctance to grant standing to
neighboring cities and potential housing consumers reflects a grow-
ing judicial reticence to supervise the general use of control
powers.84
This deference seems to be a sound institutional role for the
courts once it is realized that judicial interference with the work-
ings of the quasi-market between suburbs could lead to an overall
inefficiency of public goods packaging within the entire metropoli-
tan region. The courts' substitution of their own standards for an
individual suburb's could not approximate the valuing of the pub-
lic goods and externalities that local voters could exert either with
their votes or their feet. The imposition of uniform standards for
the entire set of suburbs (i.e., at previous normal levels) would lead
to regional inefficiency.
(2) The presumption of validity can be rebutted where it can
be proved that either some people have been denied access to
the community on grounds other than their purchasing power
(e.g., a denial of equal protection based on race) or that the
process of decisionmaking has been biased or based on inade-
quate information (e.g., a denial of procedural due process).
The courts have been very active in insuring that the exercise of
government powers by the municipality does not exclude citizens
on the basis of racial classifications." If a substantial proportion of
those who would register their preferences with their votes or by
moving between jurisdictions are excluded from participation in
the quasi-market, then the resulting decisions will be inefficient.
Judicial intervention need not be justified on the distribution
ground that these groups deserve more of the wealth in the com-
munity but on the efficiency grounds that their consumer prefer-
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal. 3d 762, 54 Cal. Rptr. 453, 592 P.2d 728 (1979)
(billboards); Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (architectural review).
82 See cases cited in note 2 supra. See generally Clark & Grable, Growth Control in Cali-
fornia: Prospects for Local Government Implementation of Timing and Sequential Control
of Residential Development, 5 PAc. L.J. 570 (1974).
as E.g., Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63 Cal. Rptr.
889 (1962). See generally Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Timed Growth: Resolving the
Issue After Mount Laurel, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 1237 (1977).
:4 E.g., U.S. Steel v. Save Sanekey, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). See also note 76 supra.
11 E.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ences are not being taken into account.86
The judiciary, particularly the state judiciary,87 has traditionally
been concerned with the procedural fairness of individualized land
use decisions. One can see this concern with the method of deci-
sionmaking being carried forward in a number of new areas. Re-
cent decisions have begun to require procedural fairness not only
in the traditional administrative setting of a variance tribunal but
more recently within the legislative halls themselves.8 Courts have
not only held the various administrative and legislative bodies to
their own rules of procedures, such as the number of hearings and
adequacy of notice, but have also put in place stricter standards to
insure the appearance of fairness.89
Since the efficient functioning of the set of suburban govern-
ments depends upon the local legislators responding to the valuing
of size, cost and service level by the local residents, these judicial
interventions seem justified. The procedural protections and the
intervention to deal with arbitrary decisions which do not reflect
all relevant information and deliberation are a manner of insuring
the reasoned valuing of local preferences.
(3) Landowners should be protected from "takings" to the ex-
tent of the reduction in value of their parcel below what a "los-
ing" parcel would have been worth under the expected state of
risk of government policy. The remedy available to landowners
can be either damages or an injunction to allow use of the par-
cel not at its highest and best use but at the least beneficial use
risked.
The courts have never set a single standard to deal with the tak-
ings problem;90 that is, when is the individual being asked to make
too great a sacrifice for the common good? Our examination of the
landowner's problem has shown that there are three crucial deter-
minations to be made. First, what was the extent of risk of govern-
ment policy that was capitalized into the land market price? This
See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975).
87 See note 72 supra.
8 Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Biske v. City of
Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969); see Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as
an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MIcH.
L. REV. 1341 (1975); Freilich, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington
County: Is Rezoning an Administrative or Legislative Function?, 6 URB. L. vii (1974).
"8 See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
90 See D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNET & A. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF
GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1977); notes 30-32 & accompanying text supra.
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shows whether the owner has suffered any unpriced risk that might
need compensation. Second, one has to make a normative determi-
nation whether such losses require protection. Third, there is the
institutional determination as to which unit of government should
provide such compensation and how it should be established.
The variety of judicial doctrines which can be invoked (harms
and benefits, physical invasion, diminution in value) all allow the
particular judge to make his own conclusion on each of the three
determinations." In different jurisdictions there are different
methods used which reflect the local judiciaries' determination of
the existing state of expectations upon the part of landowners. In
some jurisdictions the judges feel that the landowner functions
without any certainty. of expectation as to the government's guar-
antee of potential urban use.2 In these jurisdictions, it takes some-
thing akin to physical invasion to amount to a constitutional tak-
ing. In other jurisdictions the judges feel there is a very high
degree of certainty of government behavior and one sees the use of
injunctions to protect such landowners from any surprise at all.9 3
In most jurisdictions, however, the judiciary is unclear about the
capitalized expectation of government behavior in the land market
place as well as about the solution of the distribution problem be-
tween this group and the rest of the citizens."4 The trouble with
the doctrine is that judges have difficulty knowing what was or was
not priced into the expectations which set market value, and have
no normative consensus about when compensation is or is not re-
quired. Thus the "doctrinal schizophrenia" 95 will no doubt be with
us for a good long time, and our model does not particularly help
See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
92 See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237
(1975); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See also Hagman,
The Taking Issue: The HFH et al. Round, 28 no. 2 LAND USE & ZONING DIG. 5 (1976).
93 E.g., Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517
(1954).
94 There have been numerous articles on the subject of what is a taking, but the area is
still as murky as it was twenty years ago. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE
TAKING ISSUE-AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973);
D. HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978);
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974); Dunham, A
Legal and Economic Base for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958); Dunham,
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Michelman, supra note 36; Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modifications of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of the
Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1967).
" Costonis, supra note 37, at 1047.
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the judges in distinguishing when a "taking" has occurred. What it
does do, however, is to give some guidance to the judges once they
have made the first two decisions (that there was an unpriced loss
and that it should be protected). That is, the model shows that the
correct compensation should only be the loss of value below the
priced-in risk. If a judge determines the government policy was
outside the boundaries of the capitalized risk he can protect the
owner with damages representing the unpriced risk or an injunc-
tion for some minimal use within the risk. However, unless he
thinks there was absolute certainty in the land market he would
never grant an injunction at full market expectation (which re-
wards the owner for a risk he took and lost) or damages at the
previous market price (which is the value before the risk was run).
(4) The presumption of validity can be rebutted where it can
be proved that the suburb's program does not serve the re-
gional welfare of lower income people. The proper remedy for
the affected group is injunctive relief.
For the last two decades the courts have been grappling with the
suburb's use of growth controls to create unified income and mini-
mum price, residential-structure housing communities. The various
state courts have taken very different approaches to these "exclu-
sionary" controls.96 While some jurisdictions have not interfered at
all, others, particularly Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Michigan,
have intervened with regard to a variety of subject matters.9 7
These include invalidating or reducing large minimum lot size re-
quirements"' and forcing provisions for mobile homes.9 9 Courts
have also required the provision of apartment houses in communi-
ties without some substantial apartment development10 0 and on
some occasions have struck down minimum floor space require-
" There are a great many articles on the subject of exclusionary growth controls. For a
complete bibliography, see 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 627 (1971). For an analysis of the use of
constitutional doctrine for redistributive purposes, see Michehnan, The Supreme Court,
1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
97 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See generally D.
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 185-269.
1s E.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
99 E.g., Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Green v.
Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972); Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v.
County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969).
100 See Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972); In re
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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ments. 101 Courts have intervened in a variety of instances where
the suburb's use of its powers seems to be specifically designed to
preclude one particular low-income project.102 Finally, the most
important development has been recent judicial intervention to
force local suburbs to take into account the regional welfare when
establishing an amount of low-income, low price housing.103
The exclusionary cases have not been dealt with in any uniform
manner. Our model gives a clear picture of the reasons for this pat-
tern of judicial behavior. The combination of a property tax, which
finances local services that are distributed equally to all residents,
with the suburb's power to tax and regulate, produces a series of
mono-income residential structures in each suburb. This system is
efficient, but it precludes a wealth transfer between the suburban-
ite and any new resident who would live in a lower valued struc-
ture. Further, it produces a pattern of metropolitan urban living
with a series of rigid regulatory and tax barriers separating rich
from poor, and in the context of the current distribution of wealth,
white from black, Asian or Chicano. Whether this is good or bad,
and whether the courts ought to do anything about it depends on
normative value judgments concerning the distribution of wealth,
the character of a just society and the role the judiciary ought to
play in establishing that society. Those judges in jurisdictions
which do not intervene conclude that either local governments are
not good vehicles for wealth distribution or that their judicial role
prevents them from making choices they wish the state legislature
would make. Those judges in jurisdictions that do force some level
of lesser value structures make opposite judgments; that redistri-
bution is necessary and they are the best situated governmental
entity to make them.
These redistributions can only be accomplished by granting
some group of lower income people access to the suburb, and thus
the remedy must be an injunction rather than mere damages. The
result of this is that even the most activist judge tends to be some-
what apprehensive about making decisions that will not only have
distributive impacts of a regional importance but will also affect
101 See In re Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
202 See, e.g., In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See also Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) (based on racial discrimination).
103 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). Contra, Pasack Ass'n v. Mayor & Council of Washington, 74 N.J. 470,
379 A.2d 6 (1977).
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the efficiency of the functioning of the entire set of suburbs. A
murky set of doctrines allows the activist judge to limit his inter-
vention to those situations where there are clear distributional in-
equities and only small efficiency impacts on the entire system. So
long as he mandates a small percentage of lower-than-average-
property-value dwellings within all suburbs, this should not seri-
ously impair the efficient functioning of the quasi-market.
CONCLUSION
The courts are playing a crucial role in the public dialogue con-
cerning suburban growth controls. It has been the purpose of this
article to develop an appropriate economic model of the suburbs'
functioning. This will allow the judiciary and its advisors to predict
the efficiency impact of the various programs and to pinpoint the
distributional problems with which they must grapple.
To construct this model, an analogy has been drawn between a
private market and the quasi-market which exists in our metropol-
itan areas where households/consumers can choose among exter-
nality levels and public service bundles offered by the various sub-
urbs. 104 The model has shown that there are two very different and
independent problems with which judicial doctrines must deal.
The first is the efficiency of the entire system to meet the prefer-
ences of the household/consumer. The market analogue, like other
markets, has shown itself to be quite efficient at meeting the de-
mands of those people who have enough purchasing power to be in
the market. 10 5 The second is the distribution problem presented by
those people who do not have enough wealth to participate. 10 The
quasi-market, like other markets, does not do a good job of redis-
tributing wealth to those who cannot afford to utilize the market.
This distinction is a crucial one, for it indicates that it is logical
for the courts to leave the quasi-market to function as it may, with
local suburbs setting public goods levels and externality levels as
they choose. Aside from ensuring the effective functioning of the
market by, for instance, making sure that adequate information is
provided, the present hands-off policy encourages efficient use of
suburban resources. On the other hand, if social norms indicate
that the existing distribution of wealth is inequitable, it is also
10, See notes 6-12 & accompanying text supra.
105 See notes 42-54 & accompanying text supra.
106 See notes 55-60 & accompanying text supra.
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consistent for the courts to intervene in order to redistribute some
of the suburban wealth to lower income households/consumers who
cannot take advantage of this efficient regional system.
